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THE OTHER COSTS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
Penny J. White*
INTRODUCTION
The landscape of judicial elections has changed dramatically over
the last two decades as a result of Supreme Court precedent and lower
court litigation focusing on the First Amendment rights1 of candidates
for judicial office,2 special interest groups, labor unions, and corpora-
tions.3  What was once a rather boring, decorous affair—in which can-
didates talked about their practice prowess, public service, and
military backgrounds—judicial campaigns have become virtually in-
distinguishable from campaigns for other political offices.  Freed from
the restraints of judicial ethics codes, it now is commonplace for can-
didates for judicial office to taut personal views on a host of social
issues and to respond to questionnaires that ask them to identify with
a particular Supreme Court justice or to announce their position on
capital punishment, abortion, gun control, or other hot-button issues.
Television advertising, previously foreign to state judicial cam-
paigns, has become the norm.4  Millions of dollars are spent each elec-
tion cycle on advertisements that promote candidates’ personal views
* Elvin E. Overton Distinguished Professor of Law; Director of the Center for Advocacy and
Dispute Resolution; Interim Director of the University of Tennessee Legal Clinic, University of
Tennessee College of Law.  The author extends appreciation to her research assistants, UT Col-
lege of Law students Michael Deel, Machen Picard, Evan Rothey, and Sean Bright for their
assistance on this article.
1. The cases that have followed and largely expanded upon the decision in Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) are of two kinds.  First, many courts have ruled upon
lawsuits seeking to enjoin the enforcement of judicial campaign speech and conduct provisions.
Secondly, many courts and administrative bodies have ruled upon First Amendment defenses
raised by judges and judicial candidates alleged to have violated similar ethics provisions. See
Penny J. White, “The Good, The Bad, and the [Very, Very] Ugly,” and (its Postscript) “A Fistful
of Dollars,” 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 615, 653–62 (2004).
2. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
3. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 692–93
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that “because of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United
v. FEC, the analysis is straightforward.  There the Court held that the government has no anti-
corruption interest in limiting independent expenditures . . . .”).
4. Scott Greytak et al., TV Ads May Influence Judges Long After Election Day, in THE NEW
POLS. OF JUD. ELECTIONS 2013–14: BANKROLLING THE BENCH (2015), http://newpoliticsreport.
org/report/2013-14/chapter-3/tv-ads-may-influence-judges-long-after-election-day/; see also
James Sample et al., TV Ads Continue to Dominate Supreme Court Races, in THE NEW POLS. OF
369
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on social issues.5   These advertisements are funded by organizations
and interest groups—some identifiable by name, others veiled in am-
biguous slogans6—that support candidates based upon their perceived
political ideologies.7  It is not unusual for candidates or their support-
ers to spend ten times the amount of the annual judicial salary to elect
the candidate to the judicial position.8
Experienced jurists are targeted often based on a single unpopular
or controversial decision.  Additionally, by extrapolating from past de-
cisions, ads attack judges projecting how they may rule on future cases
that raise matters of social interest.9  Candidates whose political ideol-
ogies mirror those of deep-pocket special interest groups are some-
times recruited to run against incumbents with the hope that their
personal political ideology will carry over to their judicial decision-
making.  These challengers may receive direct campaign contributions
or may be aided less directly, but nonetheless powerfully, by advertis-
ing that links the candidate with particular points of view held by the
interest group.  And while there certainly is no spoken quid pro quo
between the financier and the candidate, it often happens that the
candidate, once elected, does not disappoint her benefactor.
In the face of this distasteful milieu, public confidence in the judici-
ary wanes.  Any hope that the judiciary will be viewed and appreci-
ated as a unique governmental institution that is untethered from
money and uninfluenced by politics is at best diminished, and at worst,
lost.  Although studies and surveys consistently confirm this negative
impact, and scholars address the issue regularly, neither the studies
nor the scholarship seem to induce change.10  Many states continue to
JUD. ELECTIONS 2006 (2006), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/NewPoliticsofJudicial
Elections2006_D2A2449B77CDA.pdf.
5. See generally The New Politics of Judicial Elections, JUSTICE AT STAKE, http://
www.justiceatstake.org/resources/the_new_politics_of_judicial_elections.cfm.
6. For example, the organization funded by Don Blankenship, then President of Massey En-
ergy, which resulted in Brent Benjamin being elected to the West Virginia Supreme Court was
named “For the Sake of the Kids,” ostensibly because the organization’s campaign ads attacked
an incumbent justice for the release of a defendant in a child abuse case.
7. Greytak et al., supra note 4, at 6, 26–27.
8. See generally The New Politics of Judicial Elections, supra note 5.
9. Three judges in Iowa were removed in 2010 following a 2009 decision allowing same-sex
marriage under the Iowa Constitution.  The issue would not receive federal constitutional scru-
tiny by the United States Supreme Court until 2015. Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2607–08 (2015), with Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009). See infra note 24
and accompanying text.
10. See Adam Skaggs, Buying Justice: The Impact of Citizens United on Judicial Elections
6–11, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
legacy/publications/BCReportBuyingJustice.pdf; John Feerick et al., Judicial Elections Report,
COMM’N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 11–16 (2004), http://
www.nycourts.gov/reports/JudicialElectionsReport.pdf; Benjamin Woodson, The Two Opposing
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subject state court judges to some form of public election or, alterna-
tively, to legislative branch oversight.
In addition to the argument that citizens want to elect their judges,
maintaining the status quo is the safe alternative for states in light of
consistent Supreme Court precedent holding firm on the dictates of
the First Amendment in the “political speech” (albeit judicial candi-
date political speech) arena.  Although the Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged the negative aspects of judicial elections,11 the Court has
declined to consider judicial elections differently than elections for
legislative and executive branch positions.  The Court has upheld the
right of judicial candidates to speak their views, the right of voters to
hear their views, and the right of outside groups—including corpora-
tions and unions—to fund electioneering communications promoting
those views.12
While the distastefulness of judicial elections has not led the Court
to differentiate between the rules that apply in judicial and other elec-
tions, the Court has recognized that once the candidate becomes a
judge, different values are implicated.  In Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Co.,13 the Court received its first taste of the bitter combination of the
White and Citizens United decisions.  In Caperton, the issue was not
the right to speak, hear, or spend in the political arena, but rather the
impact of those rights in the courtroom as evidenced by the behavior
of the judge on the bench.14  The aftermath of the First Amendment
victories in White and Citizens United was the untoward circumstance
of a judge deciding a case involving his largest supporter.15  Justice
Kennedy, author of the majority opinion in Caperton, embraced judi-
cial disqualification as an antidote to the harms occasioned by an un-
yielding First Amendment.16  While the First Amendment would not
tolerate restrictions on political speech and campaign expenditures,
states could articulate standards of judicial conduct that advance the
states’ interest in assuring “citizen’s respect for judgments [which] de-
pends in turn upon the issuing court’s absolute probity.”17  Even the
Effects of Judicial Elections on Legitimacy Perceptions, ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 24, 24–26 (2016),
https://doi.org/10.1177/1532440016647410.
11. See White, 536 U.S. at 803–04, 806 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
12. Id. at 781–83; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342.  Other courts have expanded the rationale
underlying corporate expenditures to special interest groups, allowing them to spend unlimited
funds on electioneering communications as well. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 693, 698.
13. 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009).
14. Id. at 884–85.
15. Id. at 872.
16. Id. at 887–89.
17. Justice Kennedy first previewed his support for robust recusal provisions as a means of
countering the influence of money on the courts in White.  536 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concur-
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Caperton dissent endorsed the freedom of states to adopt broad
recusal rules.18
Thus, the negative impact of dark money on judicial elections is rec-
ognized but tolerated due to the significant First Amendment rights of
candidates, voters, and corporations.  Additionally, the potential neg-
ative impact of dark money on judicial behavior is acknowledged but
neutralized by the rights of the states to enforce rigid recusal
provisions.
This Article first suggests that the costs of judicial elections extend
far beyond the millions of dollars spent on judicial campaigns and the
concomitant diminished respect for the integrity of our justice system
and permeate the system to its core.  Judicial elections cause the jus-
tice system to be less productive and less efficient.  As a result of judi-
cial elections, members of the judiciary are less experienced and less
likely to be guided by precedent and by the fundamental principle of
stare decisis.  Thus, judicial elections may produce a judiciary that is
unable to fulfill the purpose envisioned for America’s courts.
Second, this Article argues that ingrained within our constitutional
framework is a mechanism for addressing these problems: a renewed
commitment to fundamental due process.  If, in reality, we are com-
mitted to the principle that “justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice,”19 the due process rights of citizens who bring their disputes to
the courts for resolution must be as essential as the First Amendment
rights of those who seek public office and those who spend money to
put them there.
ring). See also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (noting that the connection between a contribu-
tor and candidate could not be eliminated by banning or curbing political speech, but reiterating
that states could require judicial disqualification).
18. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 893 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).  Before state courts were prompted to revisit their judicial recusal procedures, most
state court recusal rules shared common elements as well as common flaws.  They were geared
toward discouraging recusal and were largely unfeasible and unworkable.  In most states, the
initial decision of whether to recuse was made by the judge whose recusal was sought.  More
often than not, the judge decided the issue orally on the record and was not required to enter a
written order.  If a written order was entered, it generally contained only the judge’s ruling,
without analysis or explanation.  The refusal to recuse was not appealable until after the case was
determined on the merits.  Since Caperton, and perhaps in reaction to concern that Caperton
would cause an avalanche of recusal motions, many states have modified and arguably strength-
ened their recusal provisions, requiring the counsel seeking recusal to file a written motion sup-
ported by specific affidavit, and the judge making the finding to file written findings of fact and
conclusions of law. See, e.g., Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 1.01.  Some states require that the recusal
motion be heard by a different judge and most states now allow an interlocutory appeal if the
motion is denied. Id. § 2.01.
19. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
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II. THE OTHER COSTS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
A. Inefficiency
At the most basic level, judicial elections require judges to cam-
paign to retain their judicial posts.  Judicial campaigns distract judges
from the duties of their office.  As a judicial candidate, a judge must
employ, and may have to learn, a skillset that is much different than
what they use on the bench.  Depending on the size of the jurisdiction
and the seriousness of the opposition, judges may be required to make
public appearances, deliver stump speeches, and ride in holiday pa-
rades.  Even in small jurisdictions or states in which appellate judges
run in district-wide rather than state-wide elections, the number of
public events that judges feel compelled to attend during election sea-
son is staggering.  These range from civic club lunches to sponsored
“debates,” which further blur the distinction between judicial candi-
dates and other candidates for public office.
Before hitting the campaign trail, judges have to prepare for the
campaign.  In addition to preparing relevant canned remarks, judicial
candidates must consider how they will respond to questions they are
asked on the campaign trail.  Since White, judges can no longer legiti-
mately repeat the once-familiar excuse for declining to answer: “I am
sorry, but my code of ethics prohibits me from answering.”  Addition-
ally, a judge cannot decide whether and how to respond to campaign
questions in the moment.  Rather, the judge must determine in ad-
vance how she wants to run her campaign.  She may need to study
judicial ethics opinions or consult with state judicial ethics boards,
election advisors, or judicial mentors.  In serious situations, a judge
may be prompted to seek a formal or informal ethics opinion.  And
even with the best preparation, questions will still be posed that the
judge is uncertain how to answer.
When a judge is preparing a campaign talk, considering potential
ethical issues, or simply traveling to a campaign event, the judge is off
the bench and away from the task of judging.  Whether or not they
contribute to the campaign coffers, the public pays for the judge’s
campaign with the loss of the judge’s time on the bench.  In the best-
case scenario, judges become judges by day and politicians by night; in
the all too frequent worst-case scenario, the judges’ campaign activi-
ties take precedence, causing dockets to stall and cases to linger until
after the election is decided.20  Realistically, not all campaign activity
20. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.  As one example, the five justices on the Tennes-
see Supreme Court wrote, on average, 7.5–8 opinions each per year in the 9 years preceding the
2014 election, and an average of 6 opinions for the year of, and following, the 2014 election.
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can occur after court adjourns for the day.   Even the most conscien-
tious public-service oriented judge fields inquiries during the day, at-
tends campaign luncheons, and adjourns court early or cancels
something on her docket to make an event.  Simply put, incumbent
judges have to work to keep their seat while being paid their judicial
salary.
Even when a judge manages to be in the office or on the bench
during election season, the judge is necessarily distracted.  This is par-
ticularly true when the judge is the subject of unfair opposition
campaigning and attack ads.  The judge may be concerned about the
negative campaign’s impact on her family; in extreme cases, the judge
may fear that the portrait painted of her may spark extreme reactions
or even violence.21
B. Lack of Productivity
When an incumbent trial or appellate judge is on the campaign trail
and away from the bench, individual efficiency will likely decline.  Ad-
ditionally, when an appellate judge is forced to campaign, the entire
appellate court’s productivity will be affected.  The appellate judge
may fall behind in drafting opinions or reviewing the drafts of others,
or may refrain from deciding certain cases, knowing that the vote
could be used by the opposition candidate.22  Appellate judges may
21. Examples range from name-calling and bullying to encouraging voters to visit judges’
homes and call their personal cell phones. See Kate Berry, How Judicial Elections Impact Crimi-
nal Cases, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (2015) http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/
files/publications/How_Judicial_Elections_Impact_Criminal_Cases.pdf (including examples of
attacks on Justice Lloyd Karmier, Illinois; Justice Louis Butler, Tennessee; Justice Janet Stumbo,
Kentucky; and Justice Bridget McCormack, Michigan).  As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has
stated, “[c]riticism is fine; retaliation and intimidation are not.”  Sandra Day O’Connor, A Fair,
Impartial and Independent Judiciary, NAT’L VOTER, Feb. 2008, at 8.
22. Generally, the circumstances that cause significant delay in the issuance of an appellate
court opinion are unknown unless a sitting judge chooses to comment.  For example, Justice
Donald Corbin of the Arkansas Supreme Court, whose term ended on December 31, 2015, re-
vealed in an interview that the Arkansas Supreme Court had voted to strike down a state law
ban on same-sex marriage in a case they heard on November 20, 2014.  But rather than issue the
ruling, the court held the decision for several months, awaiting the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. Ex-justice: State Supreme Court Vote to Strike Ban on
Gay Marriage, Held Ruling, ARK. NEWS, Nov. 11, 2015, http://www.arkansasnews.com/news/ar-
kansas/ex-justice-state-supreme-court-voted-strike-ban-gay-marriage-held-ruling.  In other cir-
cumstances the reason for delay may be unknown, but looking at the delay in relation to other
events may be telling.  For example, a same-sex couple who filed for divorce in Texas on Febru-
ary 10, 2010, were not definitively divorced until June 19, 2015, when the Texas Supreme Court
finally affirmed the trial court and intermediate appellate court’s orders, and after one member
of the couple had died.  State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. 2015), aff’g 330 S.W.3d 434 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2011); see Billy Corriher & Eric Lesh, Marriage Equality Cases Languish Before Elected
Judges, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-corriher-lesh-gay-
marriage-lawsuits-20150601-story.html.  The lower court granted the divorce in court on Febru-
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innocently delay issuing opinions in order to give their colleague more
time for review, or may strategically delay issuing opinions in contro-
versial or publicized cases.23
When an appellate judge is being challenged, the appellate court
may delay issuing decisions until after the election for reasons that are
less offensive than strategic delay.   For example, in close cases and
cases raising novel legal issues, the appellate panel may want to assure
that the decision is reached by judges who will continue to serve.  Ad-
ditionally, the panel may have been divided on the outcome of the
case and may anticipate that the division will clear if a new judge is
elected.   Additionally, in a significant case, the presiding judge may
prefer that a decision be reached by judges who remain on the bench
after the election.  The potential for having a significant case decided
by a judge who was defeated in an election is particularly acute when
more than one appellate judge is on the ballot at the same time.24
ary 10, 2010, and denied an intervention motion filed by the state the following day.  The denial
of the motion was finalized by the trial court in a written order entered on March 31, 2010.  The
Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order on January 7, 2011, and the state ap-
pealed to the Texas Supreme Court.  Oral argument was heard by the Texas Supreme Court on
November 5, 2013, but a decision was not rendered until nineteen and a half months later, on
June 19, 2015.  State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. 2015).  Between oral argument and the
issuance of the decision, on November 4, 2014, three of the justices, who ultimately sided with
the majority in affirming the trial and appellate courts, ran for and were re-elected to their seats.
23. Regardless of whether it is for valid or strategic reasons, delay is problematic.  Two fairly
recent state court examples stand out.  In 1998, Hugh Caperton sued Massey Energy Company
in West Virginia.  In August 2002, after a seven-week trial, the jury awarded Caperton $50 mil-
lion.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 98-C-192, 2005 WL 5679073, at *5 (W. Va. Cir. Ct.
Nov. 12, 2009); History of the Case, JUSTICE AT STAKE (Jan. 22, 2018), http://www.justiceat
stake.org/resources/in_depth_issues_guides/caperton_resource_page/history-of-the-case/.  While
the case was on appeal, Don Blankenship, the chief executive officer of Massey, through organi-
zations, spent $3 million in support of Brent Benjamin, a candidate for West Virginia’s high
court.  Five years later, in 2007, after refusing to recuse himself, Justice Benjamin voted to re-
verse the jury verdict.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008), rev’d
and remanded, 556 U.S. 868 (2009).  The decision not to recuse was reversed by the United
States Supreme Court in 2009 and the case was returned to the West Virginia courts. Caperton,
556 U.S. at 872.  In a case with even higher stakes, the Illinois Supreme Court delayed an appeal
for a similar amount of time following a trial court verdict in a class action in which $1.05 billion
in damages was awarded against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.  Avery v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 97-L-114, 1999 WL 955543, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 1999).
Although oral argument was held in the Illinois Supreme Court in May 2003, the court did not
rule until August 2005, after a newly-elected justice who received over $1 million in campaign
funds from donors aligned with State Farm had joined the court.  The trial court verdict was
reversed and the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari.  Avery v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1003 (2006).
24. In 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, established the right to same-
sex marriage under the Iowa Constitution.  Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).  This
decision set off a campaign to unseat three of the seven justices facing a retention election the
following year.  A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
4, 2010, at A1.  The three justices were targeted by conservative interest groups, many from
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C. Inexperience
1. Trial Judge Learning Curve
Stated simply, judging is a learned rather than an innate skill.  How
judging is learned and what exactly is involved is hard to pinpoint, but
Justice Cardozo characterized judging as acquired knowledge, noting
that a judge learns “from experience and study and reflection.”25
Judging is not “staked out for [the judge] upon a chart.  [The judge]
must learn for himself as he gains the sense of fitness and proportion
that comes with years of habitude in the practice of an art.”26  A judge
must honor restrictions “established by the traditions of the centuries,
by the example of other judges, his predecessors and his colleagues, by
the collective judgment of the profession, and by the duty of adher-
ence to the pervading spirit of the law.”27  While others disagree and
espouse more of a “realist” attitude about judging,28 for purposes of
this discussion, what is most important is not specific models of juris-
prudence, but rather an acceptance of the proposition that our justice
system is premised upon the idea that judges make decisions based
upon knowledge and application of the law—not merely based on
personal choice.29
Having been a “baby judge” myself (the phrase used to refer to new
members of the judiciary), I have experienced first-hand the transition
from lawyer to trial judge, from trial judge to intermediate appellate
judge, and from intermediate appellate judge to supreme court justice.
Additionally, as a state court judicial educator for the last twenty-five
outside of the state, who collectively raised money to oust the judges.  When Chief Justice Mar-
sha Ternus, Justice David Baker, and Justice Michael Streit were defeated in their retention
elections, one commentator expressed that “a combined three decades of experience . . . ended
in a single day.”  Sharyn Jackson, Iowa Gay Marriage Ruling a Turning Point for Justices, USA
TODAY, Apr. 2, 2014, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/04/02/iowa-gay-mar
riage-ruling-a-turning-point-for-justices/7237453/.  Similarly, Tennessee Senate Speaker Ron
Ramsey, joined by “Tennesseans for Judicial Accountability,” led a politically-motivated cam-
paign to unseat three of the five justices of the Tennessee Supreme Court facing a retention
election in 2014.  Alan Blinder, Conservatives See Potential in Tennessee Judicial Race, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2014, at A10.  Chief Justice Wade, Justice Connie Clark, and Justice Sharon Lee
narrowly retained their seats.  Brian Haas, Tennesseans Vote to Retain Supreme Court Justices,
TENNESSEAN, Aug. 7, 2014, https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2014/08/07/tennesse
ans-vote-retain-supreme-court-justices/13756359.
25. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921).  Justice
Cardozo describes the judge as legislating “between gaps,” filling in the “open spaces in the
law.” Id. at 69.
26. Id. at 113–14.
27. Id. at 114.
28. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 401, 403 (1950).
29. Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making,
in JUDGES ON JUDGING 95, 96 (David O’Brien ed., 5th ed. 2017).
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years, I have witnessed, assisted, and mentored hundreds of others in
their journey to acquiring the aspired status of a learned judge.
The transition from bar to bench is cumbersome and difficult.  Law-
yers moving from practice to the bench have to shift from advocate to
neutral arbiter.  They must assume the passive role of sitting and
watching the trial unfold rather than orchestrating and directing the
action.  For trial lawyers, this adjustment may be particularly difficult
in cases in which the parties are not ably represented.  As Judge Mar-
vin E. Frankel has observed, the “adversary system poses a threat to
neutrality.”30  Judges who disagree with an advocate’s trial strategy or
are pained by counsel’s ineptitude may find sitting passively by and
“calling balls and strikes” almost unbearable.  The gap between the
active role played by the trial lawyer and the passive role of a trial
judge is great indeed.  New trial judges have to learn to allow the par-
ties to try their cases, and to hold their tongue lest they make a state-
ment that interferes with the jury’s province of finding the facts.
Equally dramatic is the shift from manipulating rules of evidence
and procedure to applying them fairly, equally, and hopefully as writ-
ten.  A trial lawyer is accustomed to making alternative evidentiary
objections, hoping the judge will select a reason and sustain the objec-
tions.  But as a trial judge, the former lawyer must analyze each objec-
tion under the applicable rule.31
Lawyers who leave transactional practices or the government arena
to take the bench may face an even steeper learning curve as they
familiarize themselves with trial procedure, docket control, and jury
management.  The learning curve is also steep for judges who have
specialized in their practice.  This is particularly true in rural areas,
where judges sit in general jurisdiction courts, often without the aid of
judicial clerks, handling both civil and criminal dockets.  Rarely will a
judge be prepared adequately in all areas of the law and often a judge
will have no exposure whatsoever to certain common legal disputes.
This occurrence is encountered quite frequently because of the ten-
dency of prosecutors to become judges, leaving them ill-equipped to
deal with a whole range of commercial disputes, family law matters,
and general civil litigation.
30. Marvin E. Frankel, The Adversary Judge: The Experience of the Trial Judge, in JUDGES ON
JUDGING (David O’Brien ed., 5th ed. 2017).
31. Trial judges seem to crave more training on the Rules of Evidence than any other subject
matter.  The National Judicial College, for example, the nation’s largest provider of judicial edu-
cation programs for state-court judges, offers various evidence programs each year for state
court judges, including Evidence in a Courtroom Setting, Advanced Evidence, Scientific Evi-
dence, and many online courses on evidentiary topics as well. THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL COL-
LEGE 2018 COURSE CALENDAR, http://www.judges.org/2018courses/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2018).
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Like any new employee, a new judge must adjust to the skills re-
quired by the job, earning her salary while learning how to do the job.
The more frequently the members of the judiciary change, the more
often new judges engage in on-the-job training.  During this training
period, delay is common because of the new judge’s lack of confi-
dence or uncertainty in applying the law.  A trial judge that is not
prepared to render a decision32 may take cases under advisement, de-
spite the common admonition by veteran judges not to do so.  The
judge may be in one of the many jurisdictions that does not fund judi-
cial clerks for general jurisdiction judges.  Without judicial clerks and
with a mounting docket, the trial judge may be unable to acquire the
necessary chambers time to deliberate and reach a decision—leaving
the parties in a state of uncertainty.  Conversely, the new judge may
adhere to colleagues’ admonitions to rule from the bench, but may do
so by relying on her gut.  When the trial judge rules from the hip, she
may err, prompting an appeal, or may fail to make the requisite find-
ings, necessitating a remand after appeal.33
2. Appellate Judge Learning Curve
If the transition from lawyer to trial judge is difficult, then the tran-
sition from trial judge to appellate judge seems, at times, unmanage-
able.  Although the move from an intermediate appellate court to a
state court of last resort may seem like a small step in comparison,
that move also involves a complex transition in which the role of the
judge is altered dramatically. The vast majority of states’ intermediate
appellate courts are obliged to hear all appeals as of right and, in do-
ing so, may correct legal error.  Conversely, most state courts of last
resort control their docket by exercising discretionary review in lim-
32. Most commentators agree that delay in rendering a decision not only harms the litigants,
but also decreases the quality of justice in individual cases and the overall respect for the justice
system. See Hans Zeisel, Jr. et al., DELAY IN THE COURT (2d ed. 1978).   Nonetheless, decisional
delay persists as one of the most common criticisms of the American justice system as well as
one of the most common grounds for judicial discipline. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
JUDICIAL CONDUCT REPORTER 1 (Winter 2010) (collecting cases from numerous jurisdictions).
33. Appellate courts are unable to rule when a trial judge has failed to make factual findings
as required by law.  9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2571, 219 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that specific findings by trial court facilitate appellate review);
see Alleyne v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 516 F.3d 96, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting an appellate
court’s ability to “mine the record for facts,” but remanding to require the trial judge to make
factual determinations); In re Picht, 403 B.R. 707,  713–14 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009) (recognizing
that parties are better able to determine whether to appeal when a trial court fulfills its fact-
finding function because “[m]any a well-written decision has quelled an appeal”);  F & M Mktg.
Servs., Inc. v. Christenberry Trucking and Farm, Inc., No. E2015-00266-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL
6122872, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2015) (illustrating the problem when trial judges are
either unaware or unwilling to meet their obligations).
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ited circumstances, such as when a lower court overturns a state stat-
ute or interprets the state constitution.  The role of state courts of last
resort is not to correct all legal error, but rather to address important
issues of law, secure uniformity of decision where conflicts exist, and
exercise supervisory authority.  Accepting this jurisdictional limitation
may, in and of itself, prove challenging for the new member of the
court.34  But despite the steepness of each of these learning curves, the
most demanding transition by far is for those who rise directly from
practice to a seat on a state supreme court.
The new appellate judge enters an existing group of judges.  She is
not only a novice at her job, she is also an outsider.  The existing
members of the court, or the section or panel, have developed per-
sonal and professional relationships with one another.  Not only do
the judges know one another’s positions on recurrent legal issues, they
know one another’s staff, clerks, and family.  They likely know on
which issues their colleagues can bend and on which issues they will
stand firm.
Even when the new appellate judge remains abreast of the state’s
appellate case law, the new judge cannot appreciate the personal or
professional dynamics between the judges.  The new judge has not
heard the debates in the deliberation room, nor read drafts in which
the opinions were hammered out.  For at least the first few months,
the new appellate judge is an alien in a new world.
Even if the new appellate judge was previously a trial judge, she
must learn a new skillset when she moves to the appellate bench.  She
now must shift from being decisive to being a consensus-builder.  The
appellate judge’s task is to “persuade, not pontificate.”35  Addition-
ally, applying the limitations of appellate review can be tricky and
even frustrating.  Accepting the facts as found, as well as resisting the
urge to reassess them, demands discipline.  Acceding to the very lim-
ited role that intermediate appellate judges play in the vast majority of
cases takes effort, particularly when the new appellate judge has
served previously only as an advocate or as a finder of fact in non-jury
34. Trial lawyers, trial judges, and even intermediate appellate judges who have ascended to
the highest state court immediately face the limitations on that court’s jurisdiction.  Because
most state courts of last resort exercise discretion in determining which cases to hear, these
courts are not so-called “error-correction” courts.  Although the impact of a particular decision
may correct an error of a lower court, because of the limitations on jurisdiction, the courts of last
resort do not concern themselves with the vast number of legal errors made by trial and appel-
late judges.  Even in cases in which the state’s procedural, statutory, or constitutional rules give
the state’s highest court the discretion to hear a case, the grant of review remains subject to a
vote of the members.
35. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1186 (1992).
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matters.  Learning that an appellate judge must only confirm the trial
judge’s application of the law and must leave in place erroneous appli-
cations when they are deemed harmless may leave the novice appel-
late judge feeling more like a robot than an integral part of the
institution of justice.
Individual judicial tasks may also be difficult for new judges.  Many
lawyers rarely write, and even those who do are accustomed to writing
in an advocate’s voice.  Lawyers who become judges must learn to
write in a different voice to different audiences.  The veteran appellate
judges may mentor and help, but they will also scrutinize the new
judge’s work individually and through their judicial clerks, taking ex-
tra time to study drafts, review citations, and test the new judge’s
logic.  In addition to the extra time and resources that this takes, the
dynamic may impact the new judge’s confidence as well as her future
interactions and relationships with her colleagues.
Finally, the new judge’s experience on the appellate bench will be
impacted by the very nature of appellate courts.  Appellate courts
hear and decide cases in panels, or en banc, primarily because of the
underlying belief that the quality of the decision improves when mem-
bers of a multi-judge panel share their insights, combine their re-
sources, and collaborate on the decision.  But finding one’s place
within the group may prove challenging to the new judge.  As noted,
existing members of the court will have existing relationships.  Moreo-
ver, they may have opposed the new judge’s election, particularly if
the new judge replaced a former colleague.  The incumbent judges
may have drawn conclusions about their new colleague based on the
tone and content of the campaign.  The new member may enter the
fold having been prejudged by her colleagues in a way that hampers
the development of trust, confidence, and collegiality.  If the new
judge has displaced a colleague, conflict may be inevitable and even
extreme.36  When the campaign was hard-fought, the new judge may
be facing ethics complaints that interfere with the transition from can-
didate to appellate judge.37  When the judge is elected to the body that
also supervises the judicial ethics proceedings, the subsequent pro-
ceedings may be extremely sensitive and awkward.38
36. Wis. Judicial Comm’n v. Prosser, 817 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Wis. 2012).
37. Wis. Judicial Comm’n v. Gableman, 784 N.W.2d 605, 631 (Wis. 2010).
38. Id.
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D. Lack of Adherence to Precedent and Lack of Respect for the
Principle of Stare Decisis
Because state courts handle the vast majority of legal disputes in the
country—some ninety-seven percent of cases—they play an influen-
tial role in shaping and stabilizing citizens’ lives and commercial inter-
ests.  A state court’s interpretation of state constitutions, statutes, and
the development of the common law is essential to enable citizens and
businesses to conform their conduct to the law.  In fact, the common
law process has been deemed the “core element in state court deci-
sion-making.”39  Because state courts adjudicate the vast majority of
disputes, certainty and adherence to precedent is critical to individuals
and institutions alike.  Courts must interpret common law in a way
that promotes stability and allows individuals and corporations to pre-
dict impact.  Therefore, the application of the principle of stare decisis
and adherence to precedent is essential.40
Adherence to precedent is the central feature of our adversarial sys-
tem.  “[T]he virtues of the doctrine [of stare decisis] encompass effi-
ciency, stability, reliability, and predictability, legitimacy and the
appearance of impartiality, non-capriciousness, and consistency.  Stare
decisis is also recognized as supplying some guarantee of substantive
equality.”41  When courts frequently reverse course or strike down
legislation, the decisions always have the potential to destabilize the
economy and to disrupt family life.
Studies establish that stare decisis and precedent are more impor-
tant to judges who have a judicial mindset.  A judicial mindset is de-
fined as the quality of thinking about a legal issue from a neutral,
detached, and unbiased point of view.42  The mindset of judging is ac-
quired over time, and some who come to the bench to promote an
ideological agenda never accomplish nor desire that mindset.  Thus,
new judges—those who have not yet acquired the mindset of judg-
ing—are less likely to adhere to precedent or to honor the principles
of stare decisis.  Moreover, unlike novice judges, experienced judges
have been shown to be more constrained by the principles of stare
decisis even in situations in which they would prefer a different hold-
39. Judith S. Kaye, State Court at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading
Statutes and Constitutions, in JUDGES ON JUDGING 334, 335 (David O’Brien ed., 5th ed. 2017).
40. Id.
41. Mark Sabel, The Role of Stare Decisis in Construing the Alabama Constitution of 1901, 53
ALA. L. REV. 273, 274 (2001).
42. See Stefanie Lindquist, Stare Decisis as Reciprocity Norm, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO
WITH IT?  WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT 186 (Charles Geyh ed., 2011).
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ing.43  Experienced judges do so, in part, because of established rela-
tionships with their colleagues on the bench and a desire to maintain a
collegial environment.44  A judge’s motivation to maintain relation-
ships and to promote collegiality is influenced greatly by the length of
the term as well as the judge’s tenure on the bench.45
A study of courts in Alabama, New Jersey, and Florida identified an
“opportunistic overruling hypothesis” that indicates courts overturn
precedent more frequently when the bench has changed.46  In addition
to more regularly overturning precedent, studies show that courts with
frequent change in composition may overturn precedent more quickly
than courts with more steady membership.47  Thus, “[t]o the extent
that one values strong adherence to precedent, institutional structures
that favor that result include judicial appointments with longer tenure
lengths and a smaller court.”48
Two related group dynamic phenomena may impact the novice
judge’s lack of respect for precedent.  The so-called “longevity effect”
impacts the degree of cooperation that members of a group will dis-
play.49  When most members of a group anticipate that they will be
making joint decisions for a substantial period of time, that recogni-
tion impacts their behavior, leading them toward cooperation and
away from conflict.50  This cooperation benefit becomes discounted
when members anticipate that their relationships will be less lengthy
or when change is anticipated.51 Additionally, studies demonstrate
that appellate courts and individual judges are influenced by a so-
called “panel effect.”52  Studies of federal appellate judges have found
that decisions of appellate judges are influenced not only by the indi-
vidual judge’s opinion, but also by the preferences of the judge’s panel
43. Id. at 175–76, 186.
44. Id. at 186.
45. Id. at 177 (indicating that judges with shorter terms, or those nearing retirement, tend to
rule more sporadically).
46. Stefanie A. Lindquist & Kevin Pybas, State Supreme Court Decisions to Overrule Prece-
dent, 1965-1996, 20 THE JUST. SYS. J. 17 (1998).
47. Id. at 32–33 (noting that “since 1965, the Alabama Supreme Court has overturned 62.7
percent of its overruled decisions within 10 years of their being decided.”  No systematic study
has been undertaken to determine whether there is a more benign justification for this quick
turnaround, such as correcting drafting errors.).
48. See Lindquist, supra note 42, at 187.
49. Id. at 177.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The studies consider the panel effect on federal appellate judges who, unlike most of their
state counterparts, have life tenure.  No studies determining whether that distinction would elim-
inate or reduce the panel effect on state appellate judges have been completed.
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colleagues.53  While the panel effect phenomenon is not clearly under-
stood, studies indicate clearly that “panel effects do not result from a
dynamic wholly internal to the three judges hearing a case, but are
influenced by the environment in the circuit as a whole as well.”54
Thus,
Bargaining and compromise on the part of the majority judges is
more likely to occur when the panel minority is aligned with the
circuit court as a whole.  Moreover, a minority judge is likely to
stand her ground and refuse to go along with the majority’s prefer-
ence when she is more closely aligned with the circuit than with the
majority.55
As appellate judges change, appellate courts change.  Frequent
change in the composition of the appellate judiciary results in a less
efficient, less productive, and less experienced appellate court.  Recur-
rent change at the appellate level can also produce a court whose
members lack respect for precedent and discount the importance of
the principles of stare decisis.
III. THE GREATEST COST: THE LOSS OF THE DUE PROCESS
GUARANTEE OF A FAIR TRIAL IN A FAIR TRIBUNAL
Inefficiency.  Lack of productivity.  Inexperience.  Lack of respect
for precedent and the principles of stare decisis.  These are some of
the serious, yet rarely discussed, costs of judicial elections.  Should dis-
cussion of these costs inform our general concerns about the negative
impact of judicial elections?  Might these issues be integrated into the
framework that surrounds our discussion of judicial election reform?
Does the fact that judicial elections also result in less efficient, less
productive, less experienced, less predictable, and less stable courts
enhance the likelihood that judicial elections themselves violate due
process?  I have suggested an affirmative answer to these questions,
arguing that these costs must be added to the formula used to evaluate
whether judicial elections themselves violate due process of law.56
At its core, due process embraces a fair trial in a fair tribunal.57  The
common thread joining century-old precedents that address the pa-
53. Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Court of Appeals: An Em-
pirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 1319 (2009).
54. Id. at 1375 (noting that clearly “both minority and majority judges on ideologically mixed
panels differ in their voting behavior depending upon how the preferences of the circuit as a
whole are aligned relative to the panel members”).
55. Id. at 1369.
56. Penny J. White, A Matter of Perspective, 3 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 5 (2004); Penny J.
White, Musings on White, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 626 (2004).
57. When the former Solicitor General began his oral argument in Caperton with the quote
“[d]ue process requires a fair trial in a fair tribunal,” it provoked an immediate question by
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rameters of the due process guarantee is that a fair trial in a fair tribu-
nal embraces more than fundamental procedural safeguards.  In
addition to the basic right to notice and a hearing, a fair trial in a fair
tribunal requires a fair and neutral arbiter and decisional integrity.58
For example, judges who take bribes violate due process because
implicit in the concept of due process is the notion that a fair tribunal
is presided over by a fair arbiter.  But due process demands more than
a non-corrupt judge—it demands a competent judge.  This aspect of
due process accounts for the removal of judges from office who are
mentally incompetent as well as the restrictions on non-lawyers serv-
ing as judges.59  Due process also requires the timely administration of
justice as evidenced by constitutional and statutory guarantees to a
speedy trial.60  Even in the civil context, there is general adherence to
the notion that “justice too long delayed is justice denied.”  Our jus-
tice system values efficiency not just for efficiency’s sake, but based on
an understanding that disputes must be resolved promptly to enable
parties to proceed and the system to retain its legitimacy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The cases that have brought about the existing landscape for judi-
cial elections share a common, singular focus—the rights secured by
the First Amendment.  Although the cases have been brought by dif-
ferent categories of litigants—candidates for judicial office, voters,
party leaders, and corporate spenders—each litigant has stood on ei-
Justice Scalia.  “Who says?” Justice Scalia asked.  However, Olson’s statement was undergirded
by century-old precedent.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
556 U.S. 868 (2009) (No. 08-22).
58. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904–05 (1997).
59. Twenty-eight states prohibit a non-lawyer judge from trying a defendant for an offense
punishable by a period of incarceration.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Davis v. State, 2016 WL
4010822, at *57a–67a (No. 16-123) (Appendix I); see, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 596 S.W.2d 779, 788
(Tenn. 1980) (holding that the right to counsel becomes “as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal”
if there is not a “concomitant right to a trial before a qualified judge”); State v. Dunkerley, 365
A.2d 131, 132 (Vt. 1976) (holding that “defendant has a right to representation by a legally
qualified attorney [and that] to require a lesser standard of judicial authority would be to defeat
that constitutional purpose”); Gordon v. Justice Court, 525 P.2d 72, 79 (Ca. 1974) (holding that
“due process demands that henceforth a defendant charged with an offense carrying a possible
jail sentence must be provided with an attorney judge to preside over the proceedings”).  Four-
teen others allow non-lawyer judges to try the defendant facing incarceration initially, but only if
there is a right to a trial de novo by a law-trained judge.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Davis v.
State, 2016 WL 4010822, at *57a–67a (No. 16-123) (Appendix I).  But eight states have allowed
non-law judges to try defendants facing incarceration without a de novo review by a law-trained
judge. Id. (listing Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, New York, South Carolina, Texas, and
Wyoming as fitting into this category).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2012); Kloper v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967).
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ther the right to speak, hear, or spend.  As a result, we generally have
viewed the problems occasioned by dark money in judicial elections
through the perspective of a singular lens—the lens of the ubiquitous
First Amendment.  In so doing, we have neglected adherence to a con-
stitutional principle of equal importance—the right to due process of
law.  Even accepting the First Amendment rights of judicial candi-
dates, citizens, parties, and corporations, we still must determine how
those free speech rights are to be reconciled when they conflict with
other constitutional rights.  Are free speech rights to be treated as
rights that dominate all others?  Or must they too yield when in con-
flict with the equally compelling right of litigants to a fair trial in a fair
tribunal?  If, as Justice O’Connor lamented in White, “the very prac-
tice of electing judges undermines [the compelling state] interest” in
having “an actual and perceived . . . impartial judiciary,”61 then per-
haps (as Justice Scalia offered in jest), “the practice of electing judges
is itself a violation of due process.”62
If we are committed to the Constitution’s guarantee of due process
of law, it is time to address the elephant in the room.  Judicial elec-
tions produce a justice system that is impacted by dark money, influ-
enced by politics, and undermined by special interests.  Judicial
elections have other costs that compromise fairness and encourage
disrespect for the courts—inefficiency, lack of productivity, inexperi-
ence, and diminished respect for precedent.  Given these costs of judi-
cial elections, the lurking question remains the same: how do we
reconcile the present-day system of selecting judges with the funda-
mental promise of due process of law?
61. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788–89 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (describing judges in elections as having a “personal stake” in the outcome of cases and as
being motivated to “favor donors” and noting that judges must be aware that certain rulings will
hurt their reelection efforts).
62. Id. at 782.
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